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How to Regulate new Bottlenecks of Digital Television 
Distribution? Media and Infrastructure Owners’ Interests in the 
Reformation Process of the Swiss Radio and Television Act 
 
Corinne Schweizer 
 
1. Introduction 
The digitization of broadcasting is well underway. Analogue (terrestrial) switch-off has already taken 
place in the US and most of the European countries. Yet digital television, irrespective of its mode of 
distribution, also poses new challenges. On the one hand, copyright holders, TV channels and 
infrastructure owners are given new opportunities for restricting what viewers can do (e.g. CI+). On the 
other hand, infrastructure owners (often having significant market power) may choose to create 
bottlenecks and restrict access to their platforms and facilities such as conditional access systems, 
application programming interfaces or electronic program guides. Given these potential conflicts, the 
adjustment of broadcasting regulation to the digital age is heavily contended. 
However, while scholarly attention is often devoted to the results of regulatory reform, the policy 
process and the actors involved are rarely investigated in-depth. Only few studies focus on the interests 
and the influence of actors in communication policy-making, let alone in the area of digital television 
distribution and corresponding bottlenecks. In the present paper, focusing on the case of Switzerland, I 
will examine which interests two groups of actors – media companies and owners of communication 
infrastructure – bring into the policy-making process and whether they are successful in shaping the 
reform of broadcasting regulation to their advantage. By drawing on policy analysis, I investigate the 
different phases of the revision of the Swiss Radio and Television Act (RTVA) which recently came 
into effect. In what follows, I shortly discuss the application of the theory of policy analysis to the 
political system of Switzerland and present the propositions as well as the method employed. Then I 
present the results of the analysis before coming to a conclusion. 
 
2. Theory of policy analysis and Swiss policy phases 
Regulation is the result of different interests brought into a policy-making process by political, economic 
and societal actors. In order to analyze their respective influence it is not sufficient to merely focus on 
the output of the policy-making process alone, as communication-policy scholars often do. Rather, it is 
necessary also to investigate how different actors try to influence the policy-making process itself. 
Therefore, I draw on the theory of policy analysis. Following Dye (1976), Schubert and Bandelow 
(2003) argue that policy analysis focuses on what political actors do, why they do it and what difference 
it makes. In this perspective, politics is conceptualized as a decision-making-process that is divided into 
different phases. Based on Lasswell’s (1970) seminal paper, many phase models have been developed 
(see for example Schneider & Janning, 2006, p. 50, Windhoff-Héritier, 1980). All of them begin with 
the definition of a problem and end with a political program (Werner & Wegrich, 2003). 
When applying models of the policy cycle to Switzerland, it is necessary to take into account the 
peculiarities of the country’s political system. On the one hand, Switzerland is a concordance 
democracy; on the other hand every federal act is subjected to a binding referendum, if at last 50.000 
citizens sign a petition. This has crucial implications for the political decision making (Lüthi, 2006, p. 
128; Klöti, 2006, pp. 155-158; Linder, 2006, pp. 105-107, 115). Sciarini (2006, pp. 429-516) divides the 
process of policy formulation in Switzerland into four phases: 
• Impulse Phase: Based on input from political parties, associations and civil-society organizations, 
decision-making processes are usually initiated by state actors or by the Cantons. 
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• Pre-Parliamentary Phase: A group of experts within the administration develops a draft bill which 
is subjected to a public consultation. Political parties, interest-groups, the Cantons and ordinary 
citizens are asked to hand in written statements of opinion. This consultation aims at detecting 
whether the draft bill is considered feasible and broadly accepted. The submitted statements are 
evaluated by the administration before introducing a revised bill to the parliament.  
• Parliamentary Phase: One of the houses of parliament begins with the reading of the bill. At first, 
it is treated by the responsible selects committee; afterwards the house debates the propositions. 
Then, the second house follows the same procedure. If there are disagreements between the two 
houses, up to three rounds of reading are possible until a conciliation conference has to be held. 
Eventually, both houses have to pass the bill. 
• Referendum Phase: After the parliamentary phase, citizens have the possibility to take a referendum. 
Before implementation begins, the government has to pass an ordinance that concretizes the different 
provisions of the act. Sometimes, another public consultation is conducted. In the present paper, the 
ordinance phase will also be taken into account. 
 
3. The reform of the Swiss Radio and Television Act 
Due to the changing media environment, including digitization, the Swiss Radio and Television Act 
(RTVA) was completely revised between 1998 and 2006. The policy-making process consisted of the 
typical phases that the Swiss political system features (see section 2). Many different actors were 
involved in the reformation of the RTVA: The Federal Office of Communication (OFCOM) as 
regulatory agency, parliamentarians and other politicians, the Cantons and ordinary citizens. Of 
particular importance in this case is the participation for media and infrastructure owners. For both 
groups there was a lot at stake and it can be reasonably assumed that there are conflicting interests 
regarding almost every question of distribution regulation. One can expect that media companies are 
basically interested in a kind of regulation that guarantees access to the communication infrastructure 
for all stations in order to distribute their programs. Infrastructure owners, however, would normally 
oppose regulation that restricts their freedom of action and prefer a market solution (Gourd, 2002, pp. 
171, 179). 
P 1: Owners of the distribution infrastructure argue against a regulation of digital television distribution 
and in favor of a free market solution. 
P 2: Owners of media companies argue in favor of a regulation of digital television distribution that 
assures open access for their programs to networks and facilities. 
Given the social, cultural and political importance of the media (Ó Siochrú & Girard, 2002; Feintuck & 
Varney, 2006), access of citizens to a wide range of programs is considered vital for a democratic 
system. On the one hand, it is often argued that regulation of all networks and facilities is necessary to 
guarantee citizens’ access to public service channels (Berger & Schoenthal, 2005, pp. 17-19, 37-38). On 
the other hand, access regulation reaching beyond competition law is deemed as necessary in order to 
prevent owners of the infrastructure from abusing their market power (Schulz, Seufert & Holznagel, 
1999, p. 76; Gourd, 2002, pp. 178-184, Hoffmann-Riem, 2000, p. 13). Thus it can be argued that 
regulation should ensure that all programs are treated in an equal, adequate and non-discriminatory way 
(Weber & Dörr, 2001, p. 69). Accordingly, it can be assumed that the public interest in distribution 
regulation considerably overlaps with the private interests of media owners, as opposed to those of the 
infrastructure owners. 
P 3: As the interests of media owners overlap with the public interest in distribution regulation, they 
have a better chance of achieving their political objectives.  
In order to investigate the RTVA revision, a qualitative analysis of documents was performed (Mason, 
2002, pp. 103-119; Mayring, 2007; Silverman, 2001, pp. 119-123). Aside from various versions of the 
bill, confidential minutes of relevant selects committees, official proceedings of parliamentary sessions 
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as well as statements of interest groups made during public consultations were analyzed1 using a method 
of deductive content categorization (Mayring, 2007; Mason, 2002, pp. 150-165). Categories were 
developed with respect to different bottlenecks and regulatory options. In recent literature on regulation 
of digital television distribution (Berger & Schoenthal, 2005; Gorini & van Eijk, 2005; Gourd, 2002; 
Hoffmann-Riem, 2000; Puppis, 2010; Scheuer & Knopp, 2004; Schulz, Seufert & Holznagel, 1999; 
Weber & Dörr, 2001) there is no widely accepted classification of potential digital bottlenecks. I decided 
to concentrate on these six: general access to distribution networks, multiplexing, packetizing, set-top-
box/API, conditional access, and navigation2. Regarding the regulation of these bottlenecks, scholars 
propose a range of instruments: Among others, must-carry rules, anti-discrimination rules, price 
regulation, unbundling rules, technical standards or obligations for interoperability are suggested. 
 
4. Results 
The following results are structured according to the phases of the Swiss policy-making process 
discussed above. Every phase is presented in the following way: First, the regulatory document, or rather 
the alterations to the previous version are presented. Afterwards, it is discussed how the adopted 
regulatory decisions came into being. 
 
4.1 Impulse phase: Discussion paper and RTV Draft 
In January 2000, the Swiss government published a discussion paper regarding the revision of the 
Federal Act on Radio and Television (RTVA) containing general guidelines for distribution regulation 
and an instruction to launch the revision. One year later, the Federal Department of Environment, 
Transport, Energy and Communications (DETEC) compiled a preliminary draft of the bill, including 
explanatory notes. Concerning access to distribution DETEC suggested to maintain must-carry rules for 
programs of the public service broadcaster SRG SSR as well as for local, regional and foreign programs 
which provide “special achievements in the public interest” (RTV draft Art. 40, 41, 44, 51(1), 52). 
Telecommunication service providers would have to distribute these programs through terrestrial 
networks “in adequate quality” (RTV draft Art. 51(1)) for a “cost-based” compensation (RTV draft Art. 
51(2)). In cable, programs of the SRG SSR would have to be transmitted free of charge, as long as this 
obligation would not constitute an “unreasonable economic burden” for the telecommunications service 
provider (RTV draft 41).  
Concerning the new digital bottlenecks, DETEC proposed an anti-discrimination rule for all technical 
appliances or services of “processing” (e.g. multiplexing, packetizing, encrypting, marketing or 
selecting programs). That is, processing has to be executed on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory 
terms (RTV draft Art. 54(1)). DETEC also suggested that navigation systems must display the channels 
of the public broadcaster SRG SSR in the first stage of use (RTV draft Art. 54(2)). Furthermore, the 
Government would have the right to decide that programs considered to be of special value (SRG SSR, 
local, regional and foreign public service programs) must be transmitted on preferred channel positions 
(RTV draft Art. 56). Finally, when programs are offered as bundled packages in technical multiplex or 
for marketing purposes, third parties must be enabled to broadcast programs individually (RTV draft 
Art. 55). 
 
4.2 Pre-parliamentary phase 
The pre-parliamentary phase started with a public consultation. More than 200 actors took part and 
submitted their statements regarding the draft. Among them were several media organizations and the 
                                                          
1 Most of the analysed documents are available on www.bakom.admin.ch. 
2 In discussion and legislation the new digital platforms and services (multiplexing, packetizing, set-top-box/API, 
conditional access and navigation) have often been subsumed under the general term processing. 
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most important infrastructure owners. When preparing the bill, DETEC considered many suggestions 
brought in during the public consultation. 
 
4.2.1 RTV Bill 
In the RTV bill must-carry rules for distribution in cable were expanded to all licensed programs (RTV 
Bill Art. 65(1), 68(1) and (2)) and all must-carry rules include now services that are linked to licensed 
programs (RTV Bill Art. 65 (3), 68(6)). Price regulations were retained or broadened: In terrestrial 
networks, all licensed broadcasting channels have to be distributed for a preferential price (“cost-
oriented”) (RTV Bill Art. 65(2)), while the distribution via cable has to be free of charge, if this does 
not constitute an “unacceptable economic burden” for the cable network operator (RTV Bill Art. 68(3) 
and (5)). Furthermore, broadcasters without a license are given the possibility for must-carry status if 
they “contribute notably to the constitutional performance mandate” and if it is reasonable considering 
the technical capacity and economic situation of the infrastructure owner (RTV Bill Art. 69(1)) even 
though they have to recompense the provider (RTV Bill Art. 69(2)). Moreover, telecommunications 
operators must reserve enough capacity for broadcasting (RTV Bill Art. 64(1) and (2)). The revised bill 
also contains a new anti-discrimination rule for distribution: Access conditions therefore have to be 
equal, adequate and non-discriminatory (RTV Bill Art. 61(2)). 
Meanwhile, the already existing anti-discrimination rule for processing (e.g. multiplexing, packetizing, 
encrypting, marketing or selecting programs) (RTV Bill Art. 71(1)) was expanded to linked services e.g. 
information for electronic program guides (RTV Bill Art. 71(4)). Furthermore, not only programs of 
Public Broadcaster SRG SSR must be displayed in the first stage of using a navigation system, but also 
local/regional licensed programs (RTV Bill Art. 71(2)). Also the regulation of packetizing was extended: 
“Unbundling” does not only have to be technically possible but has also to be feasible in an inexpensive 
way. Additionally, the unbundling rule is no longer limited to programs but can also be applied to 
packetized appliances and services, if diversity of opinions is at stake (RTV Bill Art. 73(1) and (2)). 
Finally, the bill contains a completely new article regarding the interoperability of different processing 
systems: If the diversity of opinions is at stake, the Government can specify open interfaces for 
appliances or services (RTV Bill Art. 72). 
 
4.2.2 Whose positions got implemented? Whose did not? 
Comparing the statements of media and infrastructure owners during the public consultation reveals that 
the media were much more successful in influencing distribution regulation. As demanded by the media, 
the bill contains additional price regulation of distribution in cable, new must-carry rules and a provision 
for the reservation of sufficient capacity for broadcasting. Also their claim to broaden the regulation of 
program presentation in navigation systems was considered. The new anti-discrimination rule for 
distribution corresponds to a position expressed by both media and infrastructure owners. Other interests 
of infrastructure owners remained unheard: Their plea to deregulate distribution and processing by 
eliminating must-carry rules or limiting must carry-rules to the Public Service Broadcaster SRG SSR 
was not considered. Neither did they have success with their claim to abstain from anti-discrimination 
rules or price regulations in distribution or processing.  
Packetizing of programs proved to be a special case: While a TV channel and a Pay-TV provider wanted 
to avoid an obligation to “unbundle” program-bouquets, an association for critical media use as well as 
a cable network owner were in favor of the subsequent regulation. 
4.3 Parliamentary phase  
After the public consultation, the government introduced the RTV bill to the parliament. The two 
chambers of the parliament – the National Council and the Council of States – required three rounds of 
reading the bill until they adopted the new RTVA. Before parliamentary debates, the respective selects 
committees met and prepared their propositions. In some of these meetings, representatives of media 
and infrastructure organizations were invited to present their view once more.  
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4.3.1 Final Radio and Television Act 
A comparison of the final act and the bill shows that there are not many differences regarding distribution 
regulation. Nevertheless, a few important changes were made by Parliament: Firstly, cable network 
operators can decide themselves on the distribution of programs without must-carry status, and the 
financial compensation for the distribution may take into account the broadcaster’s economic benefit 
(RTVA 2006 Art. 61). Secondly, broadcasters are not entitled to operate their own appliances for 
processing if the appliances used by infrastructure owners correspond to the state of technology (RTVA 
2006 Art. 63(1)). Thirdly, if the Government stipulates open interfaces, it has to adequately consider 
appliances and services already existing on the market (RTVA 2006 Art. 64). 
 
4.3.2 Whose positions got implemented? Whose did not? 
The National Council was the first chamber to discuss the RTV Bill. In the preparatory meetings of its 
Selects Committee, invited representatives of two infrastructure companies could assert a new article: 
Cable network operators can decide on their own whether they have the technical capacity to distribute 
channels without must-carry-status and that the financial compensation for such distribution may take 
account of the broadcaster’s economic benefit of the distribution (RTV Bill NC1 Art. 70a). However, 
their proposition to limit must-carry rules was not implemented.  
When the Council of States took over the draft bill, it deleted the new article introduced by the National 
Council regarding access conditions for non-licensed channels to cable networks (RTV Bill CS1 Art 
70a). Instead, an invited representative of a regional television association could achieve that the 
distribution of programs with temporary access rights has to be for free (RTV Bill CS 1 Art. 69(2)). 
Furthermore, the Council of States added to the bill that the Government has to define a precise number 
of programs with temporary must-carry-status (RTV Bill CS1 69(1b) – both media and infrastructure 
representatives wanted this. 
In the second and third reading of the RTV Bill no more representatives were invited to the meetings of 
selects committees. Concerning digital distribution regulation, there was only one point at issue between 
the two chambers: the new article about the criteria for the decision about the distribution. Finally, the 
Council of States accepted it during the third reading (RTV Bill CS3, p. 69a).  
In sum, during the parliamentary phase, the influence of the two groups of actors proved to be equal.  
 
4.4 Ordinance phase: from draft to RTV Ordinance 
As no referendum was taken, DETEC published a draft version of a new Radio and Television 
Ordinance (RTVO) corresponding to the revised RTVA. Again, a public consultation was held and once 
more almost 200 actors handed in written statements. In spring 2007, RTVA and RTVO became 
effective. 
 
4.4.1 Draft and final version of Ordinance 
The draft version of the ordinance contained a provision dealing with open interfaces for the digital TV 
distribution. It specifies interoperability of different processing systems (RTVO Draft Art. 52(1)). In 
addition, the draft also provides some explanations of terms used in the RTVA, as for instance “cost-
oriented” or “adequate quality” (RTVO Draft Art. 41; 42). The latter is defined as “in real time, 
unmodified and complete”. Concerning quality, DETEC is authorized to specify different technical 
requirements according to different programs and distribution channels, but has to consider international 
norms. Furthermore, DETEC can denominate up to 30 digital TV programs that may benefit from must-
carry status (RTVO Draft Art. 49). DETEC is also responsible for deciding on preferential channel 
positions in cable networks (RTVO Draft Art. 51).  
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In the final version of the ordinance, the regulation of digital TV distribution remained largely the same 
– despite the public consultation. The only change is a new paragraph regarding open interfaces: DETEC 
is authorized to declare open interfaces as mandatory given that there is an international standard and 
that this is necessary to safeguard the diversity of opinions (RTVO 2007 Art. 56(2)). 
 
4.4.2 Whose positions got implemented? Whose did not? 
Neither the media organizations nor the infrastructure owners had a major influence on the final version 
of the RTVO, even though they brought in many detailed statements. Finally, only DETEC’s 
authorization to declare open interfaces mandatory if necessary, brought in by actors of both groups, 
was implemented. 
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
In this chapter, the regulation of potential bottlenecks in digital television distribution in Switzerland 
has been analyzed. Concretely, I investigated the influence of two groups of actors – media companies 
and infrastructure owners – during the reformation of the Act on Radio and Television (RTVA). 
Therefore, the different phases of the policy making process were retraced. 
An analysis of documents showed that many media organizations and the most important infrastructure 
owners used public consultations and hearings to feed their interests into the policy making-process. As 
expected, the interests of both groups of actors where conflicting in respect of almost every aspect of 
regulation.  
The analysis backs the first and the second proposition. While media organizations mostly argued in 
favor of a specific regulation of access to networks and facilities, infrastructure owners generally were 
in favor of a market solution. Media organizations supported the implementation of must-carry and anti-
discrimination rules, price regulations and a regulation of navigation systems. At the same time, 
infrastructure owners opposed most of these regulations. There are only few exceptions: Some 
infrastructure owners were in favor of unbundling rules because they wanted to have the possibility to 
broadcast single programs from multiplexes or bouquets separately. Media organizations, on the 
contrary, objected such rules. Furthermore, some infrastructure owners were in favor of open interfaces 
or technical standards to guarantee interoperability, with most media organizations opposing such 
regulations.  
The third proposition that media owners’ interests are more in line with the public interest and that they 
therefore have a better chance of reaching a favorable regulation can be substantiated as well. The 
changes made to the bill after the public consultation in the pre-parliamentary phase (an anti-
discrimination rule for distribution including linked services, a price regulation for distribution in cable 
networks, the reservation of sufficient capacity for broadcasting or the broadening of the regulation of 
program presentation) clearly overlapped with the demands of media organizations. In the parliamentary 
phase, the consideration of interest of media and infrastructure owners were balanced: On the one hand, 
distribution of programs without must-carry status has to be free of charge but on the other hand, 
infrastructure owners can decide on distribution with respect to technical capacity and the economic 
benefit of the broadcaster. In the ordinance phase, only a provision to regulate open interfaces for 
processing was inserted. Actors of both groups were in favor of this idea. 
Policy analyses help us to understand how regulatory measures come into being. In the case of the 
reformation of the RTVA, this analysis shed light on the influence of powerful media organizations and 
infrastructure companies on the policy making process. We could see that there were calls of 
infrastructure owners to deregulate television distribution, but they were not successful. It remains an 
open question whether this is due to public interest considerations of government and parliament or due 
to the successful lobbying of broadcasters for their private interests. 
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